#  Appellate finision - yirst separtment 

In the Matter of the Application of
No. 2018-998 Theo Chino and Chino LTD,

Plaintiffs-Petitioners-Appellants,
v.

The New York State Department of Financial Services, et al.,

> Defendants-Respondents-Respondents,

For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law \& Rules.

## SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD

Pages 381-438

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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK : CIVIL DIV. : PART 34
------------------------------------------X
THEO CHINO,
Petitioner

- against - : Index No.

101880/15
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES,
,
ANTHONY J. ALBANESE, in his Official :
Capacity as the Acting Superintendent, :
Respondent. :
MOTION

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80 Centre Street New York, New York October 10, 2017
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B E FORE:
HON. CARMEN VICTORIA ST. GEORGE, Justice

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ROBERT PORTAS, R.P.R., C.R.R. SENIOR COURT REPORTER

## PROCEEDINGS

COURT OFFICER: All rise, please. Part 34 is back in session, the Honorable Carmen Victoria St. George presiding. Be seated.

THE COURT: Good morning.
Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
THE COURT: Appearances for the record.
MR. CIRIC: Pierre Ciric, counsel for plaintiff, Theo Chino, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What's your last name?
MR. CIRIC: I'm sorry. Ciric, C-I-R-I-C. First name, Pierre.

MS. ROACH: Mackenzie Roach.
THE COURT: For respondent?
MR. CONLEY: Jonathan Conley, assistant attorney general with the New York State Attorney General's Office, for respondent, New York State Department of Financial Services.

MS. WRIGHT: Alissa Wright, also with the Attorney General's office for respondent.

THE COURT: The Court has before it Sequence One, Article 78 in declaratory judgment petition with cross motion to dismiss by the New York State Department of Financial Services, et al.

In addition to that, there was an amended Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

PROCEEDINGS complaint and Article 78 petition and the op -- for failure to state a claim. That's Sequence 1.

Sequence 3 is petitioner's cross motion for limited discovery; pursuant to CPLR 408 to hold the defendant's cross motion in abeyance, and, in the alternative, for leave to serve a sur reply.

Have the parties had any meaningful resolution or discussions in an attempt to resolve this matter?

MR. CIRIC: In terms of the discovery we've made some attempts. About the discovery, yes, we made attempts, yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Ciric, I'll hear you on the petition.

MR. CIRIC: Yes.
So the first issue I wanted to clarify in terms of the motion to dismiss was the standing question to ensure that all of the questions of the Court can be addressed.

At this juncture the standard is that the Court must accept all the fact as alleged in the complaint along with all of the affidavits that were supplied.

THE COURT: Okay, hold on a second.
Can you shut that air off?
COURT OFFICER: In the back?
THE COURT: Shut that air conditioner off Robert Portas, RPR, CRR
(indicating). I can't hear you. And you need to look at me when you're talking to me so that I can understand what you're saying.

MR. CIRIC: Okay. I'm sorry.
THE COURT: Okay.
It is your motion; correct? Respondent's motion?

MR. CONLEY: The cross motion --
THE COURT: The cross motion.
MR. CONLEY: -- to dismiss. Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. So speak slowly. The reporter moved up so that he can get what you're saying.

MR. CIRIC: Sorry. I didn't mean to scream.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. CIRIC: Okay, so on the standing, the standard is for the Court to look at the face value of the complaint along with all of the affidavits that are submitted.

So from the -- on the face of the affidavits
we've demonstrated that the plaintiff has standing --
THE COURT: Petitioner?
MR. CIRIC: The petitioner, I'm sorry. Has
standing because he launched a business where he would use Bitcoins in order to allow a bodega to exchange Bitcoins against phonecards or any other items sold by bodegas. He set up computer systems, he set up agreements with bodegas, Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

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 he basically made all of the appropriate investments in order to launch his business, which was in fact starting at the time of the Bit license being promulgated in the summer of 2015 .He -- before the -- right after the a Bit license was promulgated petitioner filed or submitted an application to DFS in order to obtain a Bit license. The key reason why the petitioner knows that he's subject to the Bit license is that in order for a customer of the bodega to use Bitcoin to make a payment he has to use what's called the QR~Code that was provided to the bodegas. And the QR~Code was not the bodega's QR Code but my client's QR~Code. So that establishes the fact that he was controlling the numbers that make up the Bitcoin algorithm.

Because he controlled those numbers he knew that he was subject to the Bit license, which is why he made a submission to or replied to the Bit -- applied to the Bit license.

> Knowing and realizing the financial -- significant financial impact of attempting to comply with the Bit license, within the four-month deadline following the promulgation of the regulation, my client filed pro se a petition -- an initial petition challenging the Bit license. That was in October 2015.

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 and says, "We don't have enough information to evaluate your application." At that moment my client makes the choice that continuing the application process is futile, A, because the costs were astronomical, B, because he had already had filed a challenge in October and therefore did not pursue the -- the application process and continued to -- to follow all the -- all the steps to continue the challenge.At the same time, in the beginning of 2016 he stopped the business because he knew he was going to be subject to the Bit license and that he just could not comply with --

THE COURT: '17. 2017.
MR. CIRIC: I'm sorry. No, no, January 2016. THE COURT: Okay. MR. CIRIC: Because the promulgation was in August 2015.

THE COURT: Then his license that he filed for was in October --

MR. CIRIC: He filed -- he filed in the -- he submits the submission for the Bit license in the summer. THE COURT: October -- you just said October 2016, if I heard you correctly.

MR. CIRIC: He files the challenge to the Bit Robert Portas, RPR, CRR license in October 2015.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CIRIC: I believe it's the $26^{\text {th }}$, which was about a week before the four-month expiration. And he gets back the answer from DFS in January of 2016.

THE COURT: '17.

MR. CIRIC: January 2016, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CIRIC: At that time he just stops the business. So -- and this -- and the back and forth in terms of the challenge happens at that time from October 2015 to today.

So, from a standing perspective, we supplied all the papers establishing -- all the evidence establishing that, $A$, he had the business in place, $B$, he was the one controlling the Bitcoin -- what's called the Bitcoin key to simplify the technical jargon, and therefore he knew he was subject to the Bit license.

So, from the record, either if you look at just his affidavit that establishes all of the facts, and also we've augmented the affidavit from the petitioner with additional evidence, including the agreements with the bodegas, including an example of a transaction that went through the system and the picture of the $Q R$ code that's being used in the bodegas.

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So we have -- you know, normally the affidavit should suffice, but we've augmented the affidavit with more evidence that explains it, because it's not a straight forward technology obviously as to all of the facts that support standing.

Those facts have not been countered or conflicted or opposed by the government with counter facts. The only thing that the government has said is, "Well, that's not sufficient to support standing because, you know, you could have done something else or your business could have failed for other reasons."

No, the affidavit states, "I stopped the business because I couldn't comply with the Bit license."

And, normally, at this stage of a motion to dismiss, that should suffice.

THE COURT: I'll hear you.
MR. CONLEY: As opposing counsel has noted, as the petitioner is bringing this hybrid Article 78 proceeding and challenging the validity of a regulation that was promulgated by the New York State Department of Financial Services in the summer of 2015 which regulates certain business activity involving virtual currencies. We have cross moved to dismiss that petition on three main grounds.

All of the petitioner's claims fail for three reasons:

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First, the petitioner does not have standing to bring this litigation because he's not alleged any nonspeculative facts demonstrating that the regulation has caused him a concrete injury of fact.

Second, the Department of Financial Services acted within the scope of its regulatory authority in .under the Financial Services Law when it promulgated the challenged regulation in the summer of 2015 , because the legislature expressly conferred upon the Department the authority to regulate new financial products and services as well as the providers of those products and services.

And, third, the petitioner has failed to meet his heavy burden of showing that the regulation is unreasonable and unsupported by any evidence.

Opposing counsel was discussing the issue of standing. The petitioner's do not have standing in this proceeding for a simple reason: Nothing in -- in the petition demonstrates that the regulation has harmed or is likely to harm the petitioner. The petitioner alleges that he is the owner of a business called Chino, Limited. At the time the regulation -- after the regulation was promulgated the petitioner submitted an application with the Department for a license to engage in virtual currency business activity. At the time this license was pending the petitioner commenced this litigation. Robert Portas, RPR, CRR Financial Services notified the petitioner by letter that because of the exceptionally limited amount of information it had been provided in the application that they could not process it without more, which could not have come -- could not have been a surprise to the petitioner because there was literally no information in the application about Chino, Limited, the proposed business activity of Chino, Limited. The application is mainly filled with, "I will not disclose" and "Not applicable." And at the time that he received this letter notifying him that there was not enough information to process the application he did not follow up with the Department, he did not provide the Department more information, he did not choose to get clarification about the letter or to submit an application on behalf of the other business that he alleges owning. Instead, at that time he shut down the business and alleges that the resulting financial losses constitute an injury in fact that should confer standing. But that is not enough to -- for standing under New York law. Because he closed the business and the resulting financial losses of that were the petitioner's decision. The Department never told the -- denied the petitioner a license and never told him to close down his businesses. Instead, the Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

PROCEEDINGS petitioner is trying to get standing based on speculation of how the regulation might have impacted his business down the road. And that is not sufficient to confer standing. That's a type of -- broad nondescript allegations of anticipatory harm is not enough to establish an injury in fact, and for that reason the petitioner doesn't have standing here.

THE COURT: Okay.
The petitioner only addressed one of the three points that you've raised. I didn't hear anything from the petitioner regarding the scope of the superintendent's abilities to regulate this financial product and services, nor did $I$ hear anything regarding the unreasonable or unsupported nature of this by any evidence or any argument regarding arbitrary and capricious. I have your papers on it and I'm going to give you an opportunity.

I have a question for the respondent: In the letter or in the notification in January 2016 apparently letting the petitioner know that you do not have enough information provided to you to confer upon him a license, is the Department not in effect essentially denying him a license at that point?

MR. CONLEY: No, Your Honor. If -- The letter explained that there -- due to the exceptionally limited Robert Portas, RPR, CRR amount of information they were not able to process the application to ascertain whether his business even needed a license, whether he was engaging in activity that required a license, and, so, without more the Department could not come to a decision one way or the other. And the letter makes that abundantly clear.

The application and the letter both annexed to that affidavit of Mr. Chino, I believe as Exhibits 7 and 9, somewhere in that range, the -- it makes it, one, exceptionally clear why the Department could not have come to a determination about this business; and, two, that it was not -- it says explicitly that it's not making a decision about the license one way or the other, just it needs -- there needs to be more information about what type of virtual currency business activity the applicant sees the business potentially engaging in, the proposed volume of business. There's just a litany of information lacking.

THE COURT: Is this type of letter a form letter of sorts that's sent to other people in similar circumstances or was this a letter created specifically for Bitcoin for first time ever written?

MR. CONLEY: This letter was written directly to Mr. Chino regarding his application. The Department takes each application letter it receives for a license for Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

PROCEEDINGS virtual currency business activity on a case-by-case basis. And it -- because there was no information to really go off of, really, except for the address to send the letter to, they were addressing it -- it was not a form letter that was sent to -- that is sent to all applicants.

THE COURT: Okay.
Let me hear you, petitioner, regarding the respondent's contention first with respect to their point that, number one, your client did nothing to attempt to resolve the issue, which was the Department's concern was that they couldn't make a decision whether or not you even needed a license because your client did not produce enough information and they're saying that your client did nothing to follow up on that.

And, secondly, let me hear your response to their position that -- and the case law that they've cited in New York that anticipatory harm is not going to qualify you in this --

MR. CIRIC: Okay. So --
THE COURT: -- to establish your injury in fact. MR. CIRIC: Thank you, Your Honor.

Okay, so on the client that did nothing part, because this is a facial challenge and not an as applied challenge, the client -- my client -- the client started pro se. We came in the case, in fact, in late 2016. But Robert Portas, RPR, CRR we believe that the client is still justified in what he did because there is no -- this is not a situation where there is an administrative exhaustion requirement. That's not in the statute, that's not in the writing. So the question is if he actually suffered injury in fact, which is, in fact, supported by facts in the complaint. I mean, you cannot do more -- you know, this is not speculation to have distributed $Q R$ codes to bodegas in order to initiate processing. This is not speculative, this is --

THE COURT: He closed down his business, though, without completing the application.

MR. CIRIC: Yes, right.
THE COURT: And their position is, "You could have come to us, you could have asked us questions, you could have followed up on the content of the letter, you could have I picked up the phone and spoken to somebody and said 'Hey, I started this business, I have a lot invested in it, I project that it's going to yield profit in the future. What is it that you need, Department, from me, so that I can fulfill my obligations and comply?'"

MR. CIRIC: Okay. So first part to this is the -for the petitioner the question was not "How much stack of information do I need to supply." On the face of the regulation and the fact that dozens of businesses left Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

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New York after the regulation was promulgated, the -- my client was a small business owner, knew on the face of the regulation that the cost to comply was prohibitive. It's not just the $\$ 5,000$ to initiate or to pay as a filing fee, it's also all of the requirements involving computer supports, cyber security and et cetera, that --

THE COURT: And what? What's the point? The superintendent -- the Department of Financial Services is who we entrust to come up with these regulations. They are the ones with the expertise, the exceeded knowledge to be able to come up with whatever they have as regulations for people so people don't just, you know, come out of the blue, start up companies and think that they don't have to face any regulations.

MR. CIRIC: Right. Okay.
So, on the first part, the -- on the nonresponse standpoint, the case that drives this is Police Benevolent, which is --

THE COURT: Police Benevolent? MR. CIRIC: Association of New York State Troopers, 29 A.D.3d 68. Under that case the threat of the police officers to be arrested because of mis-compliance on some other prior facts was sufficient to confer standing; they didn't need going to jail in order for the standing to be recognized by the Court. You don't need to -- if the Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

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THE COURT: That is what you believe the standard is, "Very likely"? That's your belief?

MR. CIRIC: Okay, he's got the injury --
THE COURT: Give me a case that says that.
MR. CIRIC: Okay.
THE COURT: Give me a First Department or a Court of Appeals case that says that the standard of law is "Very likely," if you are very likely to suffer a harm that suffices for the requirement.

MR. CIRIC: Okay. Police Benevolent is Third Department, Your Honor. So that -- that's -- there's another case, which is Dairy--- which is Dairylee Cooperative.

THE COURT: "Theory"? T-H-E-O-R-Y?
MR. CIRIC: Dairylee, Incorporated, 38 NY2d 6, the year is 1975, Court of Appeals.

So this is zone of interest case that says a competitor that is not directly impacted by the regulation but suffers from this regulation imposed by an agency that imposed certain -- granted, in fact, certain licensing to milk dealers has standing.

So there is case law that says -- okay, our theory is the injury has already occurred, vis-a-vis the Robert Portas, RPR, CRR
client, vis-a-vis my client because, $A$, the business was there. It's not like he had a pipe dream in a garage. I mean, his business was launched, going, number one.

Number two, he knew, and on the face of the affidavit he says, "I know that I'm subject to the Bit license, because under the technology I own the key of Bitcoin once the customer triggers the transaction." So he had to go to a Bit license.

Then you apply Police Benevolent. And Police Benevolent says he can go -- he's subject to the police power of the government. I don't know what you plan to do to people that did not comply, but he is subject to the police power of the government because the government said, "If you're not licensed you cannot run a Bitcoin business."

So from the moment that the -- from the moment that the Bit license was promulgated he understood, vis-a-vis the cost of compliance, that it was impossible for him to face, that either he had to shut down or -well, that was his only option. I mean, what am I going to do, spend tens of thousands of dollars when I -- the volume of business is not going to justify it?

So our position is he had standing at the time he filed the challenge in October 2015 because on the face of the affidavit he's -- You know, my client is not, Robert Portas, RPR, CRR you know, the guy around the street, he has expertise in Bitcoin, he's a programmer, if he tells his attorney, "I was subject to the Bit license because I own the Bitcoin numbers once they're transacted from the customer to me in order for them to settle the transactions with the bodega," that's -- that's at face value what I'm -- what I'm believing. So, from that standpoint, we have the evidence in front of the Court to establish standing. The Police Benevolent case explains why he doesn't have to, you know, go through all of the hoops, because he already filed a challenge in October 2015, so at that point there is no administrative exhaustion requirement in this. He didn't have to wait for a determination at some point in time because it's a facial challenge as to the -- the fact that my client claims that the government does not have the expertise and does not have the power under the Financial Services Law to actually regulate the coin.

THE COURT: What is the basis of that statement -MR. CIRIC: Okay. THE COURT: -- that you just made? MR. CIRIC: Yes. THE COURT: Do you not agree that Bitcoin is a financial product? Yes or no? MR. CIRIC: Okay. Okay. Our theory from the Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

PROCEEDINGS beginning of the first paper to the last page is that Bitcoin is not a financial product or service under the statutory framework passed in 2011. Yes.

THE COURT: Is Bitcoin a financial product? Yes or no?

MR. CIRIC: No. Absolutely not.
During the first piece of evidence during the hearing that was organized by DFS to -- as a prelude to promulgating the regulation, evidence was entered in the record as to whether Bitcoin should be regulated, why and how. The only entry in the record -- written entry in the record is from a professor at Boston University called Mr. Williams...

I forgot his first name. Mr. Williams. It's in the record.
...that essentially writes down black and white, and he's the only one who writes something down, that says this is not a currency, this is not money, this is basically a commodity because of its highly volatile price, it does not have characteristics of something that has -- that holds a store value, so this thing is basically no different than gold or no different than oranges to speculate upon."

So, from that standpoint, the first evidence is that during that hearing the only thing on the record is

Robert Portas, RPR, CRR something that says it's not a financial product or service. So right here and there that's the first item. There is all sorts of other decisions around the country and authority that is in the record that establishes that other states and other courts agree with that finding. Texas, Kansas, the -- two states. Okay? THE COURT: This is New York.

MR. CIRIC: I understand.

THE COURT: That's the only relevant thing.
MR. CIRIC: I understand, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. CIRIC: Another court in Florida decided the same thing.

So there is no authority in -- or no -- there is a lot of debate, obviously, these days as to what Bitcoin is, what its characteristics is, so the fact that there is uncertainty as to what it is does not confer automatically authority into an agency that actually wants to regulate Bitcoin.

In fact, the examples of the other states, from the perspective that they can be admitted, is the fact that other states have introduced legislation and not regulation in order to regulate Bitcoin. So --

THE COURT: Backtrack a second for me to the whole premise. Your client Chino's reaching out to these Robert Portas, RPR, CRR bodegas.

MR. CIRIC: Yes.
THE COURT: For what?
MR. CIRIC: Okay.
So he starts, what he wants to do is encourage the user of Bitcoin at the retail level. So he starts by trying to develop commercial relationships with the bodegas. In order to do this he says, "I'm going to first enter a contract with you to distribute phonecards." You know, the old phone cards where you --

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. CIRIC: Okay.
So he starts with that in order to establish stable customer relationships with the bodegas.

THE COURT: Okay. Stop there.
MR. CIRIC: Yes.
THE COURT: The whole point is to encourage Bitcoin at a retail level; correct? MR. CIRIC: Yes, yes. THE COURT: Okay. And he was going to do this through the use of these phonecards --

MR. CIRIC: Yes.
THE COURT: -- correct? Okay.
How does that mean that Bitcoin does not hold Robert Portas, RPR, CRR store value?

MR. CIRIC: Okay. So the calling card thing or the phone card thing is not within -- it's not key to the actual transaction. The only thing that the calling card was --

THE COURT: It's value, sir. It's value. You're the one that stood up on this record and said that, you know, part of the reason that there is this debate about whether or not Bitcoin is a financial product and your position from inception, from start to finish to today, is that it is not a financial product, that, you know, has to be equated to money. And your specific words that you used on the record here before this Court was that it does not hold store value.

MR. CIRIC: Right.
THE COURT: I'm trying to make sense of that statement in relation to what active measures your client actually took to reach out to these bodegas for the purpose of encouraging them to gain retail level with respect to these phone cards. That was the in that he used.

MR. CIRIC: Right.
So, number one, the calling card is not used to trigger a Bitcoin transaction. The calling card -- I'm sorry, phonecard is only used to initiate some relationship with the bodegas. Once that relationship -Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

THE COURT: How is that not value?

MR. CIRIC: Because that's not where the Bitcoin transaction applies. The Bitcoin transaction is for the client to come in and then pay for -- for the customer, the end user customer to come in and pay for -- for everything he wants. Whether it's with a calling card or whether it's a gallon of milk or whether it's a piece of bread. So he's going to present all that he purchases to the bodega and pay with Bitcoin.

THE COURT: How is that not value?
MR. CIRIC: That's -- that's a bartering unit,
Your Honor. That's not -- that's value, but that's not sufficient to make it money, number one. And, number two, that is not --

THE COURT: Says who? Says you? Says --
MR. CIRIC: Says the statute, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Where?
MR. CIRIC: Section --
THE COURT: Pull that section of the statute -MR. CIRIC: Sure. Absolutely.

THE COURT: -- or any case law which supports your position.
(Brief pause.)
(Mr. Ciric handing to the Court and defense counsel.)

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MR. CIRIC: Okay, so, number one, is the speech from --

THE COURT: You're giving me a speech as authority? You're kidding, right?

MR. CIRIC: No, no, no. I'm... Let me just switch you to the definition financial product or service. It's the fourth page. Page Number 4.

THE COURT: Page 4 of -- I don't have a Page 4. My starts with Page 5 of 219 on the top right hand corner. MR. CIRIC: I'm sorry, it's the definition which is the fourth physical page of the package.

Those are the definitions from the Financial Services Bureau, Your Honor. It says a financial product or service is -- essentially under 2A, either -- the first part of A, "Any financial product or financial service offered or provided by any person that's already regulated by the banking law or the insurance law."

So that's Part 1. Okay? That's not here what the statutory authority is, because in 2011 Bitcoin did not -- was not already regulated by insurance law or banking law. So it's the second part, which is -THE COURT: That's not what it says. You are misreading what it says. "Any financial product or financial service offered or provided by any person regulated or required to be regulated."

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MR. CIRIC: Right. Okay. So you either fall under that first bucket or the second bucket. But in order for that to happen you must have characteristics of a financial product or service. And the question is -- the fact that, Your Honor, at the second page of the packet you have -- which actually is the introduction or the legislative findings from the statute -- from the legislation that was passed in 2011 , it said the regulation -- the Section $F$, if Your Honor -- on the second page of the package. No, no, no, I'm sorry. Right. okay. so turn to the second page. Right. And I think it's yellow.

It says that in the legislative findings it's to provide for the regulation of new financial service or products. Well, that's an undefined term, Your Honor. It's basically not a definition of a financial product or service. Financial product or service is defined and is defined in a limited fashion. So under -- essentially -THE COURT: Look at your under your Page 4 Definition 2B, "Financial Products or Service." MR. CIRIC: Right. It's defined limitedly because "Financial Product or Service" essentially will not be a series of things, which is essentially credit to consumers. But the key is when the statute was passed and "Financial Product or Service" was -- was defined it was, A, defined Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

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in a limited fashion, and, number two, there was an exception also for either something that is regulated under the exclusive jurisdiction of a federal agency or something that's preempted by federal law. Our theory is it's also preempted by federal law because only the consumer -- the $C P B$, the Consumer Protection Bureau, has authority to define the terms.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's --
MR. CIRIC: If it's not regulated by another agency, which is one of the other exceptions in the statute.

THE COURT: Let's move on --

MR. CIRIC: Yes.
THE COURT: -- to the position that they have acted within the scope of regulating new financial products and services.

MR. CIRIC: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I'm --
THE COURT: Your adversary's position was that they're opposing on three grounds: One, that you don't have standing; two, that you acted within the scope of regulating this new financial product; and, three, that you have failed to meet the -- that high standard of unreasonable and unsupported by any evidence.

> MR. CIRIC: Okay.

So if you take aside for a moment the Robert Portas, RPR, CRR statutory --

THE COURT: The standing issue.
MR. CIRIC: The standing issue and the statutory issue, the regulation is unreasonable for a number of reasons. First is the compliance costs are enormous. There's no provisions for a small business -- there is nothing that allows a small business to --

THE COURT: Where do you have grounds to suggest that that is unreasonable and unsupported?

MR. CIRIC: There was, in fact, discussion --
THE COURT: Where is -- Is there a financial
number that you lean on? In other words, once it passes $X$ dollars it becomes unreasonable?

MR. CIRIC: Okay. There was, in fact, after the hearing in 2014 that DFS organized in order to talk about Bitcoin there was, in fact, discussions about accommodating some kind of small business waiver. And, in fact, there were discussions as to what the thresholds will be. So it was an issue that was in the record at the time that was unresolved. So it's not -- I mean, the regulators were aware that there was this issue of, you know, if Goldman Sacks is running a Bitcoin exchange it's one thing, but if a whole bunch of other small business owners are not going to be able to necessarily comply with it. So this is part of the record that the defendants or the government Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

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actually was -- had created.
So that was your first question. What was your -- I'm sorry, I forgot your second question. Oh, the -- right, okay, arbitrary and capricious.

So that's the first issue. The second issue is besides the compliant costs, that it's essentially one size fits all when it deals with record-.- recordkeeping requirements, money laundering requirements, along with all of the reporting requirements. There is in the record a recognition by the regulator that the regulator created requirements that were above and beyond the requirements for existing financial institutions and money transmitters. It's in the record along the lines of things such as longer record retaining periods, a -systematic reporting of SARs, which is the suspicious activity reports, under any circumstance when money transmitters only provided for situations where they actually have suspicions. And the third example that was in the record was, um, something that will -- there are requirements above and beyond what's being done on money transmitters, which, in fact, was recognized and acknowledged by the -- by the regulators.

Oh, capital requirements as well. The capital requirements piece is essentially a provision that says whatever the regulator is going to decide. When you deal Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

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with capital requirements on financial institutions either you set them -- you have to quantify them. So you basically are saying as a percent of assets for a bank, or, when you're dealing with a money transmitter business you deal with -- you express them in the form of $X$ amount of dollars in reserves or X amount of -- you know, $\$ 50,000$ of cash set up in a line of credit.

So they're quantifiable in order for the business owner to know what to shoot for. Here the capital requirements is whatever the regulator is going to say.

THE COURT: I'll hear you. Any reply?
MR. CONLEY: Yes, Your Honor.
Just quickly, to go back to the standing issue.
The opposing counsel argues that this is a facial challenge. And while the petitioner does attempt to bring a facial challenge to this regulation there is still a requirement that he himself has been injured by the regulation. And it's an injury in fact, it's not an injury based on hypotheticals.

The New York State Court of Appeals has defined an injury in fact to mean that the plaintiff will actually be harmed by the administrative action.

The plaintiff is basing -- the petitioner is basing his standing argument on a self-professed Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

PROCEEDINGS expertise in the field of virtual currencies, but speculation on how a law is -- or a regulation may or may not be enforced in the future is far too attenuated to confer standing to someone to challenge your regulation.

Shifting to --

THE COURT: I don't think he said that. He's basing his challenge that he was harmed -- well, obviously he gives these cases that he cites to, but he says he basically had to shut down the business and he incurred losses as a result of that. How are those losses not injuries in fact to that particular petitioner?

MR. CONLEY: Your Honor, they may be an injury to the particular petitioner, but they are not connected in any way to the actual regulation. It's based on the petitioner's understanding of how the regulation might have impacted his business in the future. The Department never advised him to shut down his business. That was the petitioner's decision based on his understanding of what could potentially happen under the regulation in the future. And that -- that type of speculation is -- is not enough to establish that an administrative act has actually caused harm that would be considered an injury in fact.

THE COURT: So it's the Department's position that the petitioner would have had to have waited for the Department to specifically say, "Shut down your business, Robert Portas, RPR, CRR you're not getting a license"?

MR. CONLEY: The -- the petitioner would have needed to have incurred an injury because of the regulation. Whether that be that he was denied an application or that he was granted an application but felt that the compliance costs were too high and the resulting financial losses were an injury, to then challenge the aspects of the regulation he objected to. But what he -or -- yes, that the Department in some way compelled him to shut down the business.

THE COURT: So what you're saying on behalf of the respondent is that there would have had to be an affirmative act on behalf of the Department to trigger his standing. In other words, the Department would have had to flatout deny him the license or grant him the license but make it feasibly impossible for him to continue. And, therefore, by that act on behalf of the Department it would have triggered his ability to then proceed forward.

MR. CONLEY: Not -- not exactly, Your Honor. The -- the Department's position is that he -- the petitioner is trying to get standing in this case with these facts by litigating a decision that had never been rendered in the first place.

THE COURT: Well, because he's trying to say,
"Listen, why do I have to wait to suffer the brunt in full Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

## PROCEEDINGS

force of this injury? You're going to deny me regardless, so let me go ahead and proceed this way."

I mean, are you telling me that he would have had to have waited for the Department to flatout say, "You're denied a license" or "You're granted a license, but these are the things that you needed to do"?

MR. CONLEY: He --
THE COURT: In other words, what the Department did instead was it gave him -- they sent him a letter, a correspondence that invited him to conversate more or to have, you know, a further discussion as to what things he could do.

MR. CONLEY: The -- the Department sent a letter saying that it was impossible based on the information provided the Department, it was in the dark, it has no idea what Chino, Limited is and whether there would need to be a license.

And the petitioner would need to show some kind of injury that resulted from the regulation. And there is -- there is no connection to the injury that they are pointing to here.

THE COURT: How is him not shutting down this business a direct response to a challenge to the regulation itself?

MR. CONLEY: Because any individual could shut Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

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down a business and then blame it on some law or regulation. There needs to be some kind of cause and effect, some type of connection between the harm you're professing to have suffered and the law or regulation that you're challenging.

THE COURT: Are you suggesting that he just randomly decided to shut down the business just because?

MR. CONLEY: It appears that the petitioner would prefer to challenge the validity of the regulation in court based on his impressions of how the regulation might have impacted him in the future.

THE COURT: Okay.
Do you have anything to add or respond, a brief reply with respect to the other issues that were raised? MR. CONLEY: Yes, Your Honor.

Just briefly on the point of the Department's authority under the Financial Services Law: The Department was created in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and in -- through the enactment of the Financial Services Law. And in enacting the Financial Services Law the legislature tasked the -- this newly formed department with the enforcement of the Banking Insurance and Financial Services Laws and provided a broad grant of authority to regulate new financial services and products and to ensure the continued safety Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

PROCEEDINGS and soundness of the banking financial insurance industries.

The petitioner and virtual currency business activity clearly fits within this. The petitioner's cramped reading of the Financial Services Law ignores the broad consumer protection mandate that's clear on the face of the statute. The virtual currency business activity that is regulated under this regulation is clearly a financial product or service. It's essentially a digital form of money, a medium of exchange that acts as a denominator of value and it can be used to conduct financial transactions, such as buying and selling goods and services.

The petitioner maintains and tries to draw a distinction arguing that virtual currency business activity cannot be a financial product or service because it does not involve fiat currencies.

THE COURT: It doesn't -- it doesn't have to -- I would remind petitioner that a financial product does not have to be a dollar or money. I mean, how -- I'm still stuck on virtual currency is a digital form of money. Is it not?

MR. CIRIC: Okay, Are you asking --
THE COURT: We will go back. Go ahead. MR. CONLEY: Okay.

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Yes, Your Honor, in certain uses it is.
And, to be clear, the regulation does not seek to regulate blockchain technology in the abstract or to regulate just virtual currencies, it's regulating virtual currency business activity, that is virtual currencies which are defined in the statute as any digital unit that is used a medium of exchange or a digitally stored form of value. And it is regulating the financial use of this for those providing financial services and products to New York residents and consumers.

The -- the petitioner's myopic interpretation of what financial products and services involves and it must involve fiat currency has -- finds no support in fact or law and it defies common sense.

THE COURT: Okay, let me just hear you briefly on the federal preemption argument.

MR. CONLEY: The federal preemption argument. The federal preemption argument is wholly without merit, Your Honor. The petitioner is arguing that the regulation is preempted by the Dodd Frank Act. But the Dodd Frank Act was enacted to preserve consumer protection laws, not to preempt them. And it says so explicitly in the texts of the statute, providing that, "Nothing in this provision shall exempt a person from complying with state law."

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PROCEEDINGS In enacting Dodd Frank congress specifically preserved the state's authority to enact and enforce laws that grant consumers greater protections than those provided by Dodd Frank itself. There's just nothing in Dodd Frank that evinces a congressional intent to preempt state consumer protection laws. And this has been -it's been explicitly recognized by the Consumer Protection Finance Bureau that Dodd Frank will not supplant consumers in the financial marketplace. This CFPB, the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau has actually, like, worked with states, including the Department of Financial Services, to protect consumers and investigate wrongdoing, by bringing enforcement actions to halt the harmful conduct that is in violation of state and federal law. There's nothing in the text of the statute to support some type of explicit or implied preemption argument.

THE COURT: Anything further?
MR. CIRIC: Sure.
If I may provide just three pieces of information for the Court: On the arbitrary and capricious part of things, the record displays that the certain blockchain technologies that are not Bitcoin could actually be reached by the regulation. There are certain products or certain technologies where you Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

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 actually use blockchain in order to develop or to make certain aspects which could actually be covered by the regulation. There's two examples.(To Ms. Roach) If you could just tell me what the index number is or...

It's actually in the -- I'm sorry, it's in the affirmation for the motion to dismiss, Section 37, Footnote 57, there is two technology names, one called Uprov and the other called Ascribe. Ascribe is an electronic copy of digital art. If you actually -- you actually --

THE COURT: Why is any of that relevant to the arbitrary and capricious standard?

MR. CIRIC: Because the regulation -- the regulation could include those type of technologies, because it says anything of value that travels essentially on the blockchain train, to make it simple. Okay, so if you picture blockchain like a train and if you put little wagons and if you have essentially electronic versions of print art or digital art, that technically is also a store value, because that's what people are trying to sell them for. So technically the regulation that is so overbroad is, in fact, cover -- could technically cover those.

The second technology called Uprov is electronic copies of photos and videos. If there is a transaction Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

PROCEEDINGS associated to those, the item that travels on the blockchain train, you could actually make an argument that this -- that the regulation covers those type of products. So if you say store value it could be anything. So basically our argument is that it's too broad. That's the first issue.

On the second issue is the statute, $1042(a)$ is not defined in broad terms. The government wants it to be broad to capture everything and anything. The statute doesn't say that. The statute is limited in nature, that's the key I want -- I want the Court to just take away from the point of the petitioner.

On Dodd Frank: If I may just -- and I apologize for the enumerization [sic] of the papers -- in the packet that I gave you there is at the end a page that is actually Page Number 4.

THE COURT: I didn't see this in your moving papers or your responsive papers.

MR. CIRIC: Actually they're in the -- they're cited. Yeah, they're cited. THE COURT: This seems to be a compilation of various --

MR. CIRIC: I'm sorry, Your Honor -THE COURT: -- definitions.

MR. CIRIC: -- I wasn't sure where you were going Robert Portas, RPR, CRR to go.

THE COURT: This here you handed up to me is not -- in its current form you've given to me is not an exhibit to anything. Is it in separates?

MR. CIRIC: Well, we cite -- actually both sides -- both sides cite a statute. It's the Dodd Frank section that essentially refers to the power of the CPB over financial products and services. So the only thing we want to attract the attention of the Court on is something called 15--- it's actually Sub Part 1511, which is on Page 4 of -- Numbered 4 -- Okay? -- I -- I don't know which page it is, the physical page, but if you look at the bottom of Page Number 4, and if you see right before, "B, Rules of Construction, Section 11," the little "11..." I'm sorry.
(Brief pause.)
MR. CIRIC: And the Number 11 says, "Such other financial product or service as may be defined by the Bureau and by regulation for purposes of this title, if the bureau finds such financial products or services..." All sorts of conditions.

So Dodd Frank said it's the CBP that defines,
Consumer Protection Bureau. I agree with the government -- we agree with the government that states have complete power to develop legislation for consumer Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

PROCEEDINGS protection. Once a product -- once a financial product or service is defined the CBP controls that. After that control takes place the government can do whatever it wants, absolutely. But, in terms of the definition, a state doesn't have the power to just come up and say that an art -- you know an art gallery or a dealer in oranges is subject to a regulation.

THE COURT: Okay. That's the argument on the Article 78 and declaratory judgment, petitioner, with the cross motions.

With respect to Sequence Number 3, the motion to compel --

MR. CIRIC: Yes.
THE COURT: -- there were papers that were filed just a few days ago. So this Court --

MR. CIRIC: Okay.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. CIRIC: Okay.
In terms of the bottom line, Your Honor, the Court -- the case law extensively supports the ability for a Court within an Article 78 challenge to order, under CPLR 408, a limited discovery order, if, in fact, the discovery is helping the Court to determine information directly relating to the cause of action.

The reason we are asking for the expert is that Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

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 since everybody and anybody disagrees on what Bitcoin is these days, the issue or the request of the petitioner is to say, Your Honor, get an expert in order to help you analyze what the economic nature of Bitcoin is.THE COURT: My question to you is if these papers that were filed on October $2^{\text {nd }}$-- these were E-filed papers?

MR. CIRIC: They were E-filed papers. The papers supporting the limited discovery request were filed in September -- were E-filed in September and I think it's the paper copies that we delivered to you last week, yes. The courtesy copies, I'm sorry.

THE COURT: The petitioner on this cross motion for limited discovery seeks to hold the defendants -- the respondent's cross motion in abeyance, or, in the alternative, for leave to serve a sur reply. Let me hear you. Are you prepared to orally argue on this motion? MR. CONLEY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.
Let me hear you.
MR. CIRIC: Yes. So the bottom line is if the Court orders -- there is ample authority for a Court to get an expert to determine critical information related to the cause of action. There is ample authority to have the court get an expert to help the Court analyze information Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

PROCEEDINGS that is critical to or directly related to the cause of action. That's the Farkas case which I refer to.

So under that rule what we basically argue is in order to get the expert -- any economic expert that can speak to the nature of -- the economic nature of Bitcoin is critical in order for -- for the Court to make the determination of whether or not Bitcoin is a financial product or service. That's number one.

Under those types of situations abeyance has been provided in situations where -- of the motion to dismiss that was filed by the other side is accommodated for the purpose of making that determination. So we have a couple of...
(Mr. Ciric and Ms. Roach confer.)
THE COURT: Your opposition...?
MR. CONLEY: Your Honor, on the discovery issue, the petitioner's motion for limited discovery is inappropriate for multiple reasons. Setting aside the particulars of the discovery that is actually being sought as a procedural matter, discovery is presumptively improper in Article 78 proceedings. And under the CPLR an automatic stay is put in place when a party files a dispositive motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211.

So, here, to direct discovery, the moving party, the petitioner, would have to demonstrate an ample need Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

PROCEEDINGS for the requested discovery that was both material and necessary to the claims being raised.

The claims being raised here are that the Department of Financial Services exceeded the scope of its regulatory authority in promulgating challenge regulation and that that -- and that the regulation, certain aspects of its scope and design are arbitrary and capricious.

In other words, the petitioner is raising pure questions of law that this court can fully and fairly review by looking at the challenged regulation itself, the enabling legislation, the Financial Services Law and applicable precedent.

Yet the petitioner is seeking a wide range of irrelevant information, including an order from the court compelling Paul Krugman, the Nobel Prize winning economist and New York Times columnist, to testify on the economic nature of Bitcoin; an order compelling the Department to produce an assortment of emails and other written documentation that was internally circulated over a three-year period; and an order directing the former superintendent, the head of the Department of Financial Services, to attend a deposition to be deposed on his internal thought processes leading up to the promulgation of the regulation.

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These requests are facially improper and inappropriate, Your Honor. And it's a quintessential example of a party seeking permission to go on a fishing expedition and find something of possible relevance that could salvage their claims. And the petitioner's request here should be denied.

THE COURT: Do you have any objection to them -their request for a sur reply? I believe that was an outstanding request, although maybe you resolved that.

MR. CIRIC: The sur reply was coming from the prior -- from the paper record prior to the filing conversion, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So that is a nonissue at this point.

MR. CIRIC: Correct.
THE COURT: Okay.
Anything to add?
MR. CIRIC: On the -- on the discovery piece, on the ample need situation, under -- By the way, limited discovery is routinely granted. Okay? This is not a situation where -- even in governmental cases or in -- it's exceptional. It's -- it's not every day, but it's not just, you know, supremely rare. So the key is if --

THE COURT: What's your response to the fact that discovery is stayed because of the filing of the motion? Robert Portas, RPR, CRR

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MR. CIRIC: Okay, the discovery, in terms of the expert, is critical to what Bitcoin is. In order to resolve the motion to dismiss that's a critical threshold question. In order for that critical threshold question to be addressed you first -- if you get the expert you have to basically stop the rest of the train. That's our request.

THE COURT: Anything further?
MR. CONLEY: Not -- No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.
This Court has fully heard the parties with
respect to Sequence Number 1 and Sequence Number 3 regarding Theo Chino against the New York State Department of Financial Services, et al, under Index Number 101880 of 2015 .

The Court reserves decision. We will put this on for a future date for a decision.

Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)

THE COURT: Back on the record.
The parties have agreed to order the transcript of today's proceeding for this Court's consideration in full of these motions. The parties are directed to order the minutes of this proceeding within the next five days. It does not have to be done expedited, but it needs to be done within the next five days and provided to the court Robert Portas, RPR, CRR upon receipt.

The Court will review the minutes, as well as obviously all the written submitted material with respect to these decisions, and the case will be next on for January 11, at 2:15 p.m. for a decision.

Thank you.
MR. CIRIC: Thank you very much, Your Honor. MR. CONLEY: Thank you.
(Whereupon, the above-captioned proceedings were concluded.)

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(It is hereby certified that the (foregoing is a true and accurate (transcript of the proceedings.
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Robert Portas, RPR, $C R R$

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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK APPELLATE DIVISION: FIRST DEPARTMENT

THEO CHINO and CHINO LTD,

Plaintiffs-Petitioners-Appellants,

- against-

NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES and MARIA T. VULLO, in her official capacity as the Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services,

Defendants-Respondents-Respondents.

Docket No. 2018-998

Supreme Court New York County Index No. 101880/2015

> STIPULATION TO SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED, by and between the counsel to the parties in this action that:

1. the reproduced record on appeal inadvertently omits a transcript of the proceedings before Supreme Court on October 10, 2017:
2. the reproduced record should be supplemented to ensure the Court has the complete record;
3. the transcript of the October 10, 2017 proceedings is correct for purposes of C.P.L.R. 5525; and
4. pursuant to C.P.L.R. 5532 and the Practice Rules of Appellate Division (22 N.Y.C.R.R.) $\$ 1250.7(\mathrm{~g})$. the foregoing supplemental Record is hereby deemed correct.

Dated: January 9, 2019
THE CIRIC LAW FIRM, PLLC
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Pierre Ciric

Dated: January 9, 2019
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